PAPERWALL: Chinese Websites Posing as Local News Outlets Target Global Audiences with Pro-Beijing Content - The Citizen Lab
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A network of at least 123 websites operated from within the People’s Republic of China while posing as local news outlets in 30 countries across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, disseminates pro-Beijing disinformation and ad hominem attacks within much larger volumes of commercial press releases. We name this campaign PAPERWALL. We attribute the PAPERWALL campaign to Shenzhen Haimaiyunxiang Media Co., Ltd., aka Haimai, a PR firm in China based on digital infrastructure linkages between the firm’s official website and the network. These findings confirm the increasingly important role private firms play in the realm of digital influence operations and the propensity of the Chinese government to make use of them.

Key Findings

  • A network of at least 123 websites operated from within the People’s Republic of China while posing as local news outlets in 30 countries across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, disseminates pro-Beijing disinformation and ad hominem attacks within much larger volumes of commercial press releases. We name this campaign PAPERWALL.
  • PAPERWALL has similarities with HaiEnergy, an influence operation first reported on in 2022 by the cybersecurity company Mandiant. However, we assess PAPERWALL to be a distinct campaign with different operators and unique techniques, tactics and procedures.
  • PAPERWALL draws significant portions of its content from Times Newswire, a newswire service that was previously linked to HaiEnergy. We found evidence that Times Newswire regularly seeds pro-Beijing political content, including ad hominem attacks, by concealing it within large amounts of seemingly benign commercial content.
  • A central feature of PAPERWALL, observed across the network of websites, is the ephemeral nature of its most aggressive components, whereby articles attacking Beijing’s critics are routinely removed from these websites some time after they are published.
  • We attribute the PAPERWALL campaign to Shenzhen Haimaiyunxiang Media Co., Ltd., aka Haimai, a PR firm in China based on digital infrastructure linkages between the firm’s official website and the network.
  • While the campaign’s websites enjoyed negligible exposure to date, there is a heightened risk of inadvertent amplification by the local media and target audiences, as a result of the quick multiplication of these websites and their adaptiveness to local languages and content.
  • These findings confirm the increasingly important role private firms play in the realm of digital influence operations and the propensity of the Chinese government to make use of them.

Why Exposing this Type of Campaign Matters

Beijing is increasing its aggressive activities in the spheres of influence operations (IOs), both online and offline. In the online realm, relevant to the findings in this report, Chinese IOs are shifting their tactics and increasing their volume of activity. For example, in November 2023 Meta – owner of the social media platforms Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp – announced the removal of five networks engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” (i.e. influence operations) and targeting foreign audiences. Meta noted it as a marked increase in IO activity by China, stating that “for comparison, between 2017 and November 2020, we took down two CIB networks from China, and both mainly focused on the Asia-Pacific region. This represents the most notable change in the threat landscape, when compared with the 2020 [US] election cycle.”

Seeding ad hominem attacks on Beijing’s critics can result in particularly harmful consequences for the targeted individuals, especially when, as in PAPERWALL’s case, it happens within much larger amounts of ostensibly benign news or promotional content that lends credibility to and expands the reach of the attacks. The consequences to these individuals can include, but are not limited to, their delegitimization in the country that hosts them; the loss of professional opportunities; and even verbal or physical harassment and intimidation by communities sympathetic to the Chinese government’s agenda.

This report adds yet more evidence, to what has been reported by other researchers, of the increasingly important role played by private firms in the management of digital IOs on behalf of the Chinese government. For example, an October 2023 blog post by the RAND corporation summarized recent public findings on this issue, and advocated for the disruption of the disinformation-for-hire industry through the use of sanctions or other available legal and policy means.

It should be noted that disinformation-for-hire companies, driven by revenue, not ideology, tend not to be discerning about the motivations of their clients. As major recent press investigations have shown, both their origin and their client base can truly be global. Exposing this actor type, and its tactics, can help understand how governments seek plausible deniability through the hiring of corporate proxies. It can also refocus research on the latter, increasing deterrence by exposing their actions.