Thompson and Cosmelli conclude that to really envat a brain, you must embody it. Your vat would necessarily end up being a substitute body. Note that they aren’t claiming the substitute body has to be flesh and blood.
– That the brain requires something wrapped around it responding to it and pumping the right juices to and fro.
Which is fine and makes total sense. From there however, the rest of the argument seems to veer completely philosophical - ie. Whether such a “body” changes the definition of what it means to “just” be a brain in a vat. It seems somewhat semantic to me, but I guess they want to make the point that consciousness is not just electrical signals.
I think the argument comes down to this:
– That the brain requires something wrapped around it responding to it and pumping the right juices to and fro.
Which is fine and makes total sense. From there however, the rest of the argument seems to veer completely philosophical - ie. Whether such a “body” changes the definition of what it means to “just” be a brain in a vat. It seems somewhat semantic to me, but I guess they want to make the point that consciousness is not just electrical signals.