Dull_Juice [he/him]

IDK stuff

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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: January 17th, 2022

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  • It’s not completely tied to Chile (and a lot of folks I’m sure know this already), but is still relevant enough and I remembered it skimming some notes:

    From the book: Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong about the Future of Transportation by Paris Marx

    "Australia is currently the largest producer of lithium, but the countries of the “lithium triangle” in South America—Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—are expected to overtake it as the major suppliers for the coming boom in global demand. The region is estimated to hold more than half of global lithium reserves, but its extraction requires sucking up vast quantities of salt brine to be evaporated. The process is not only water-intensive, but as the amount of brine is reduced, the water table drops, pulling fresh water from nearby sources and, by extension, the communities that rely on them.

    “While many of the key minerals for electric vehicles can be extracted from a range of countries around the world, existing production tends to be more geographically concentrated than oil and gas, and new projects can take many years to get started. In the short to medium term, that could create political opportunities or challenges for the countries with existing production or significant reserves.”



  • Yeah, after I wrote the comment I started finding some answers, it’s just a chore when they define an acronym once in the report somewhere and then use it nonstop so you get paragraphs like this:

    During early developmental testing, reliability concerns were identified with the Electro Mechanical Actuators (EMA) that are used to raise and lower the JBDs on the Ford class. Several modifications were implemented on CVN 78 during the PIA to improve reliability. During the August 2022 CQ, the ship experienced EMA failures on all four JBDs, which caused the ship to cancel the remainder of CQ and return early. The cause of the EMA failures 170 CVN 78 was corroded fasteners in various components of the EMA. The root cause of the fastener corrosion is being addressed, and repairs were completed prior to September’s CQ. During the September CQ, JBD performance did not adversely affect flight operations.

    So I had to go through and find what like JBD (Jet Blast Deflector) was and then piece it together. It’s a brutal document to skim because of that.

    Another example of the acronym insanity lol

    An adequate survivability assessment depends upon a combination of Full Ship Shock Trials (FSST), extensive modeling based on surrogate testing, and a total-ship survivability test (TSST). Sufficient data to assess ship survivability against close- aboard explosions should be available by the end of FY23. From June-August 2021, the Navy conducted FSST on CVN 78 including three shock events of increasing effect. The FSST identified several survivability improvement opportunities for CVN 78 against underwater threat engagements. In 1QFY23, DOT&E will publish a classified FSST report that details these results.

    It is surprising to me how many things haven’t really been tested and they’re putting this thing out on deployment.


  • So that Pro Publica article from the previous thread on the LCS being a piece of crap had a little comment and hyperlink about the USS Gerald R. Ford having reliability issues. Looks like its a PDF from the DOD with all kinds of reliability information from the different weapons programs. Honestly not sure if there’s a more secure way to link to the PDF, but let me know so I can update it.

    There’s some gems in there like for the Gerald Ford Catapults:

    During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), EMALS achieved a reliability of 614 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF) during 1,841 catapult launches (where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF, EMALS showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (460 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, EMALS reliability appeared to regress and slowed CQ. While the data are still being analyzed, the adverse effect to operations on two of the ten days of CQ was significant.

    Fun blurb on the ships self defense systems

    There may not be enough data to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the self-defense capability ofCVN 78 against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) due to testdata that will not be available for reasons discussed in the Ship Self-Defense System article of this Annual Report.

    Which leads to this in a different sections of the report:

    The Navy will not complete the remaining planned firing events against the SDTS configured with a representation of SSDS Mk 2 Mod 6 due to there being no AN/ SPY-3 radar set available to install on the SDTS. Additionally, the Navy planned to use data from live operational firing events from the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) IOT&E, but modifications to the DDG 1000 AN/SPY-3 radar no longer support the use of the DDG 1000 test data for validation of the Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) test bed. The PRA test bed is the high fidelity model and simulation the Navy intends to provide the remainder of the SSDS Mk 2 Mod 6 performance data.

    In FY22, the Navy conducted no tests on SSDS Mk 2 Mod 1 (Nimitz-class) or Mk 2 Mod 5 (Whidbey Island-class and Harpers Ferry-class), as a result of funding shortfalls, prioritization of remaining funding to conduct CVN 78 operational test on the SDTS, and Strike Group availability.

    Some of the lingo goes over my head but nonetheless, the US Navy doesn’t seem like its doing so hot.

    Editing in another thing I saw that was interesting

    I guess this JAGM is supposed to replace the Longbow Hellfire and HELLFIRE Romeo missiles and caught this:

    JAGM is survivable against a nascent or limited cyber attacker. JAGM is not survivable against a moderate-to-advanced capability threat. The Army mitigated key vulnerabilities found in two cyber test events conducted in 2017. The most recent Navy testing revealed additional vulnerabilities.






  • The mainstream Western perception of WW2 on Eastern Front is essentially distilled Nazi propaganda that was consciously pushed once WW2 slid into the Cold War, and the Soviets became the designated enemy.

    Yeah if the eastern front is talked about at all it’s generally people pulling from straight nazi propaganda. Honestly, I originally never learned anything about it but I could tell you all about the US in the Pacific or Africa or whatever.

    “When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler” by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House is a good read on the topic if anyone wants to read something about that front. It’s got the obligatory whine about the purges and Authoritarianism but otherwise is a good summary. Currently loaned my copy to a friend who was interested, which reminds me I need to get it back



  • Saw this from SCMP While under US sanctions, where did Huawei get the advanced chips for its latest Mate 60 Pro smartphone?

    This was also in the Washington post: New phone sparks worry China has found a way around U.S. tech limits

    U.S. sanctions were intended to slow China’s progress in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and big data by cutting off its ability to buy or build advanced semiconductors, which are the brains of these systems. The unveiling of a domestically produced seven-nanometer chip suggests that has not happened.

    Industry experts cautioned that it’s still too early to tell how competitive China’s chipmaking operations will become. But what is clear is that China is still in the game.

    Willy Shih, an economist at Harvard Business School, said Huawei’s breakthrough was evocative of what happened with Global Positioning System technology, now commonly known as GPS. The U.S. Defense Department developed the technology and restricted its export, wary of it in the hands of rivals. But the export restrictions pushed Moscow and other governments to develop their own versions, Shih said.

    “So it went from a situation where the U.S. really dominated that technology and everyone would come to the U.S. to buy it, to now there are all these different alternatives,” he said. “And you have to wonder if the same thing is happening now with Huawei.”

    Miller says a considerable gap remains between SMIC’s capabilities and those of TSMC, the industry leader that produces the newest chips for companies like Apple. It also remains unclear if SMIC can produce advanced chips at a scale and cost that will make its products globally competitive.

    Shih said that regardless if SMIC can reach the cutting edge, the foundry will certainly be able to produce older-generation chips at scale, possibly pushing down prices of chips worldwide. “We will see price pressure and commoditization pressure,” he said.

    U.S. companies like Intel and Qualcomm have already lost significant sales in China, the world’s second-largest economy, due to the U.S. sanctions, crimping their research and development budgets. U.S. executives fear this could weigh on their long-term strength, in an industry where only a few of the strongest, fastest companies tend to survive.